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KENYAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY: THE COLONIAL 
ROOTS OF AFRICAN SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY AITO SERVICES. 
By 
Patrick 0. Alila 
ABSTRACT 
In their attempts to find ways and means of achieving growth and 
equity objective in national development a major problem which has confronted 
both intellectuals and practitioners alike is that of unequal regional growth. 
It is the aim of this paper focusing on differential agricultural policy and 
services between regions to enhance our understanding of unequal regional 
growth as having origins in uneven agricultural development. 
The paper traces the evolution, during the colonial period, of 
Kenyan agricultural policy and services for African smallholder areas defined 
as those mainly engaged in subsistence agriculture. In contrast to approaches 
highlighting in a chronological order for the whole country, instances of policy 
especially innovations, and those emphasising marketed output for the whole 
economy the approach used identifies manifestations of policy resulting from 
attempts by the colonial administration to cope with contingencies brought about 
by crises sue h as World War I and II, the Mau J?au Emergency etc. with particular 
reference to the African areas. Thus it is towards the end of the colonial 
period, for the most part engineered by crises, that an agricultural policy for 
these areas emerges out of piecemeal actions on the part of the colonial 
administration and reactions by Africans. It is a major contention of the 
paper that the policy has basically remained the same in the post-independence 
era and is therefore crucial to an understanding of the present functioning 
of policy and services for the areas in question. 
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Introduction: 
It is a generally accepted point that the basis of the present 
Kenyan agricultural development was laid down during the colonial period. 
Furthermore that some policies formulated in that period basic to the 
economy especially the agricultural sector have in fact been inherited 
intact by the independent government. Hence the argument that even today 
after m o r e than a decade of independence we cannot discuss Kenya's current 
agricultural development policy without continually referring to policies 
and attitudes that-were initiated at varying stages of the colonial era 
and which have contributed to the present structure, performance and 
problems of the agricultural industry in Kenya.~ It follows, therefore, 
that the structural arrangements currently used in implementing the 
agricultural policy or providing agricultural services also have their 
origins in the colonial period to which they must be traced for a better 
understanding of their present functioning. To that end, we shall here 
address ourselves to the question: what significance the colonial agricultur 
policies had for the present structure of agricultural services and the 
resulting direction of agricultural development. 
Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues-
In trying to answer the above question we shall not, unlike others 
noted below, give a countrywide chronological account of the colonial 
agricultural policy but will confine ourselves as much as possible to 
the forme r so-called African or Native reserves. Although the fact 
that the area of our research formed part of Central Kavirondo and was 
located deep in Nyanza, one of the three major African reserve areas, 
bordered to the west by only the waters of Lake Victoria, is an 
important reason for such a focus, it is not the major rationale for this 
particular methodological stance. 
1. Smith L. D . ''An Overview of Agricultural Development Policy'' in 
Heyer J. et al. ed: Agricultural Development .in Kenya An Fconomic 
Assessment, Nairobi, OUP 1976, p . 111. 
2. Native., White., Kavircndc etc
s
 terms commonly, used by the colonial 
administration meant to convey the sense of original users. 
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To begin with the two common approaches used in discussing Kenyan 
agricultural policy during the colonial period are the conventional 
historical approach of recounting in a chronological order the important 
3 
agricultural developments for the whole economy or using the economist's 
key index of national economic development, the growth of marketed output 
to map out basically in a chronological order these agricultural development u 
for the entire economy. The major shortcoming common to both approaches 
is the extent to which farming in the European areas
9
 or more precisely the 
former White Highlands, is played up, leading implicitly or explicitly to 
the erroneous conclusion that European settler farming was the backbone of 
the Kenyan economy. Moreover that it had assisted the development of 
African agriculture. Thus a fair consideration is not given to African 
agriculture per se and the many problems that farming in African areas 
vis-a-vis European areas continued to be faced with which have left an 
indelible mark on it mainly as a result of having borne the burden of 
propping up the latter and not vice versa. 
The African population in the reserves was for example subjected to 
severe constraints as a result of being variously deprived of the three 
main factors of production in agriculture through land alienation and 
the extraction of labour and capital mainly for the benefit of European 
farming. Secondly the complete ban on some cash crops and the coercive 
methods of introduction of others in African areas in particular limited 
their incorporation into the market economy. Consequently their share of 
marketed output dwindled in the latter part of the colonial period instead 
of increasing as anyone would expect. And though this is correctly pointed 
out by those using the approaches in question the cause is overlooked as 
shown by the following quotation from one of the texts: 
One of the most striking contrasts between 
the economy of the 1920's and that of the 
pre-war period was the far smaller part now 
played by independent African production in the' 
export trade. In 1912-13 at a conservative estimate, 
70 per cent by value of agricultural exports had been 
•3. Wrigley, cc. Kenya; The Patterns of Economic Life 1902-45, in Harlow, 
> V e t a l , eds History of East Africa, Vol II O.U.P. 1965 pp. 231.-2; Clayton E. 
Agrarian Development in Peasant Economies, Pergamon Press, 196
11
; Brown, L.: 
VAgricultural Change in Kenya- 1945-60," Food. Research Institute Studies 
Vol VIII No. 1 1968. 
Heyer J., A Survey of Agricultural Development in the Small Farm Areas 
of Kenya since the 1920s. IDS Working Paper No. 194. October 1974 
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"native produce''. In 1928 the proportion was less than 
2C percent. Even in absolute terms the increase had been 
small, and since 1925 there had actually been a noticeable 
decline... over half was represented by hides and skins, 
the automatic by-product of subsistence pastoralism. The 
exp ort of sim-sim, once so imp ortant to the Kavirondo 
economy, had dwindled into insignific ance. Attempts to establish 
a cotton industry had been renewed in 1923 but had met with 
little success*, during the 1920s the export value of this crop 
only once exc eeded £10,000.^ 
Thirdly, negative and at tames retrogressive policies particularly 
when the so-called mother country was fighting her two major wars and 
during the Mau Mau Emergency, a crisis also entirely of her ovm creation, 
resulted in severe dislocations of agricultural development in the native 
areas. One such very significant dislocation was the emergence of landlessness 
which instead of being eradicated to increase total production by involving 
as many people as possible in production was regarded highly as an inevitable 
positive development and later constituted the cornerstone of "A Plan 
6 
to Intensify the Development African Agriculture.'
1 
In short, in view of the obvious devastating biases against African 
farming one would have thought that in analysing agricultural development 
during the colonial period, whatever line of investigation one chooses to 
follow, one would at least take cognizance of the broad thesis that to 
succeed the settlers had to have not only some kind of monopoly over the 
new economic infrastructure created by the colonial system, but also be 
in a position to undermine the control which'Africans had over their own 
productive capacity.
7 
5. Wrigley C.C. op cit p 243 
6. Swynnerton R.J.M., A Plan to Intensify the Development of African 
Agriculture in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954 
7. Brett, E.A. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in. East Africa, The Politics 
of Economic Change, 1919-1939, Heinemann, Nairobi 1973, p. 168 
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Instead, what one encounters in writings using the approaches in 
question with regard to African areas is extreme concern with innovations that 
were actually introduced into African areas despite the fact that they were 
8 
mainly for purposes ext ernal to these areas. They were mainly geared towards 
boosting export trade at certain strategic times; or preventing decimation of 
the African population by famine which threatened to curtail or bring to an 
end the surplus extraction or labour supply from these areas; all of which 
European farming depended on for survival. In addition they had to follow 
set patterns and take particular predetermined forms. 
An argument advanced specifically in connection with the overall 
growth of marketed output, mainly as a result of adoption and growing of various 
crops, which clearly condones the overwhelming advantages European farming 
enjoyed and implies a crucial role for the economy, is that African agriculture 
was only developed to the extent that it was not competitive with the interests 
of the European Sector ~ as if the various measures taken with regard to 
African farming were positively aimed at developing African agriculture while 
that of Europeans got only its fair share. 
An important variation on this innovations theme ,reminiscent of the 
thinking of colonial administrators- which betrays the extremely exploitative 
and at the same time choosey motive underlying the measures effected, i3 to 
stereotype whole communities as either tribal, conservative and resistant to 
change or individualistic and innovative - the two arch types being the Luo 
9 
and Kikuyu communities respectively. On the one hand the successful 
adaptation by the Kikuyu in particular to new circumstances in the face of 
their extreme deprivation especially through loss of land^even though this 
set the stage for a relatively higher level of exploitation: and the ensuing 
successful adoption of a particular set of innovations whose benefits Were 
well known to them but from which they had been barred, are highly dramatized 
8. 
9. 
Smith L.D. op cit is an important exception to this trend. 
Clayton op cit p. M5 
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and viewed with great approval. 
It is interesting to note that although not much later on successful 
adoption similarly applied to communities as .far a field as the Kisii of Nyanza 
and the Meru at the foot of Mt. Kenya, mainly due to almost identical ecological 
conditions found in these areas, this development is however not taken as being 
of the same significance. On. the ether hand other groups refusing to embrace 
certain specific innovations only whose benefits were not apparent to them, or 
no attempt was made to at least demonstrate them if there were any, are branded 
conservative with little or no reference to either policy content as well as 
methods of implementation or the mitigating socio-economic factors these groups 
had to contend with. 
A more plausible interpretation especially of the latter situation is 
that an end to be served by the innovations"^ was contemplated and once 
introduced they had to be accepted. And no contrary behaviour was tolerated 
unless there was a complete disaster as in the famous case of Tanganyika 
groundnut scheme which was abandoned. This however does not conform to the 
now widely know, innovations studies finding on adoption of innovations 
that when introduced an innovation can either be accepted or rejected 
depending on socio-economic and other factors. At any rate, whatever the 
outcome it is not irreversible should circumstances making for acceptance or 
rejection decision change. 
It is in this light that the general comment that what was in all 
cases questionable and was indeed questioned by the people was the sociological 
. 1 2 
implications in introducing these technical innovations can be viewed as 
10. Smith appropriately refutes the conventional wisdom that Nyanza 
people were traditional in outlook and unwilling to accept change. Smith 
op cit p. 117. 
11. Hay points out the actual status of these innovations in the African 
farming system arguing that experimentation with; new crops and implements was a 
regular feature of the agricultural system ... long before the colonial period. 
The presence of the British with their conscious attempts to intervene in the 
agricultural system simply intensified the pace of change. Hay M.J. Economic 
Change in Luoland, Kowe, 1890-1945, Ph.D thesis University of Wisconsin, 1972 
pp 129-30. 
12. Cliffe, L.R. 'Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural 
Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period in Taamuli, A Political Science 
Forum. Vol 1 No 1 July 1970 Dept of Political Science Univ. of Dar es Salam 
y 
X 
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getting to the crux of the matter. The somewhat obvious inference is that 
had there been genuine motives to develop African agriculture better judgement 
would have prevailed particularly in the execution of measures effected, 
which for all practical purposes was through coercion as discussed further 
below, and possibly minimal planning done. Thus that lukewarm support for or 
even total rejection of certain innovations could have been transformed into 
widespread adoption presents itself as a very strong possibility. The style 
of administration used by the colonial administration could not however allow 
for such a course of action. 
Crisis Administration 
Thus the premise of the approach focussing on African areas to be 
adopted in this analysis is that with regard to these areas the colonial 
administration employed, to a much greater extent relative to European areas
s 
a particular style of administration which in administrative theory jargon 
has come to be known as crisis administration. In other words that it 
reacted to problems as they reached crisis points. It is then that action 
was taken on various contingencies encountered in desperate attempts to 
avert the crises rather than formulating a line of action before the fact. 
Especially because their economy was not operating on the same principles as 
the market economy the African areas naturally presented many more contingencies 
in the face of crises. Furthermore due to the very nature of their 
economy, and more so because they were regarded by the administration as 
peripheral to the market economy and there was therefore no planned action to 
achieve any set of goals in these areas, leave, alone positive ones, except 
of course in so far as European areas stood to benefit, in the long run at 
least, they bore the brunt of crisis administration. 
The basic tenet of crisis administration was not consensus, or 
conformity to the interests of the African population, as those trying to 
compile as long a list as possible of new crops introduced over the years, 
be they for cash or. foodstuff purposes, plus the accompanying services 
would lead one to believe. It was rather a conflict of interests at least 
in terms of the nature of the demands that were placed on the population 
by the administration - not to mention its attitude towards natives - which 
used all means possible to see. them fulfilled with greater or less vigour 
depending on the gravity of a particular crisis. Likewise the contingencies 
were more or less depending on the magnitude of the vigour which determined the 
level of interaction with the populace. 
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This is not to deny.that seme of these actions yielded some 
positive results. The point is that such results were mere side effects 
and not the goals the actions intended to achieve. For example
9
 while a 
greater variety of foodstuffs relative to the period before the introduction 
of new ones improved the level of nutrition of the population the aim was to 
ensure the supply of labour and not necessarily having a healthy labour force 
at that. Similarly, although cash earned by Africans from wage labour or crops 
sold helped them satisfy some wants made mandatory by involvement in the market 
economy its express purpose was to enable Africans to pay taxes and not to 
13 
provide them with an adequate purchasing power These, and ether similar 
requirements, ran directly counter to the proper functioning of the subsistence 
economy in the short run and in the long run jeopardised the development of 
the agricultural sector especially in the African areas. A very important 
consequence of increased disruption of African economy by the colonial 
administration was that nationalist consciousness gained momentum as a result 
of articulation of African interests which in turn led, as everyone now knows-, 
to the achievement of political independence. 
As to its mode of operation, crisis administration exhibited two main 
14 
features. The first one, discussed fittingly by Liebenow was coercion. 
He argues that in contrast to the traditional African technique of 
agricultural education, which relied largelyupcn demonstration and observation, 
innovation under colonial rule took place largely under threat of coercion. 
The transformation of the economy took place initially in response to the 
demands of the tax collector for cash as already pointed out rather than 
produce. Within the subsistence economy the only way to secure cash was to 
grow a cash crop which could be sold to European or Asian traders. Later 
the transformation was spurred through legislation (nominally passed by 
African councils or chiefs) which carried with it the threat of fines or 
imprisonment for failure to comply. 
13. Leys' argument, based on calculations using Wrigley's figures, is tha 
African purchasing power was kept about as low as was possible, short of not 
paying for labour in cash at all. Leys C. Underdevelopment in Kenya. 
The Folitical Economy of Neo-Colonialism 1964-71, Heinemann, London, 1975, p 32 
14. Liebenow, J.G. , Agriculture, Education, and Fural Transformation -
with particular reference to East Africa., The Carnegie Seminar on Political 
and Administrative Development, 1969, Dept of Political Science, Indiana 
University Bhamington pp. 11-12. 
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There was for example a whole series of
 :,
Thou shait not
:;
 orders 
relating to the protection of forests
4
 grasslands, water holes and hunting 
preserves. There was a series, too, of "Thou shalt" orders which required 
people to plant cash crops for tax purposes or an extra field of cassava as 
a reserve against famine. These were followed by orders which required 
Africans to plant in aspecific way, rid their fields of proscribed noxious 
weeds, or use a specific manuring technique. Thus, through the constant 
threat of coercion, reform in agriculture was to take place. It was argued 
by administrators underlining the persistent crisis atmosphere of their 
operation that they did not have time to let education or cash incentives 
provide the stimuli to change:, by the time these took effect, the natural 
resources of Africa would have been exhausted. 
What made the coercion so objectionable is that administrators 
seldom took time to present the reform, in terms which were meaningful to the 
African Qultivator. Being asked to increase production for its own sake, 
without any assurance that he would have more things to buy or more schools 
for his children, made little sense. The. only tangible- results the peasant 
could observe from higher production were higher taxes, which were used to 
pay the salaries of policemen, tax-collectors, agricultural officers, and others 
who would only make his life increasingly miserable. Moreover the African 
farmer was constantly being asked to deal with problematical threats to his 
future (such, as the denuding of forests where he and his forefathers had cut 
wood for generations without apparent loss) rather than to respond to the 
perceived needs of the present. 
Colonial administrators argued that the value of coercion must be 
tested by the results. In areas where force was systematic and persistent, 
it did succeed in changing habits and the present generation of independent 
15 
Africans is the richer for it. It is they who are having the title deeds 
to secure loans and keeping grade-cattle the preparatory activities to which 
their fathers performed under threat of fine or imprisonment. Yet this 
argument fails to consider what the results might have been had education 
and incentives been improved. It ignores the question of how many really 
good and imaginative farmers left the land, particularly when faced with 
genuine adverse socio-economic conditions rather than continue to submit to 
senseless threats. Moreover, compulsory farming although it exposed the 
15. Liebenow ibid. 
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underlying motives of serving the needs of foreign colonialists, it prejudiced 
African attitudes against agricultural extension programs as something which 
could improve the lot of farmers. 
Yet another consequence of the punitive approach to Agricultural 
innovation which was to be of short-range disadvantage to the colonial 
administration and of long-range disadvantage to the African nationalists/^ was 
the exploitation by the nationalists 15 
of farmers' hostility toward the various agricultural rules and orders. 
It is in this context that political opposition to land consolidation in Central 
Nyanza for example should be seen although there have been repeated attempts 
to use it especially by the colonial administration during the dying days of 
their rule as-proof of conservatism of the Luo community which incidentally is 
not confined to this district alone. The problem as far as the nationalists 
generally were concerned was that they found it politically difficult when 
they assumed leadership of the country to reintroduce officially the very 
measures they once opposed. 
17 
The second feature has been appropriately termed experimentalism. 
The first major shortcoming in this case was the quality of personnel used 
who were either totally ignorant or had little prior experience with tropical 
agriculture as well as their limited numbers. In the early days it was the 
district commissioner who assumed responsibility for innovation. With only a 
liberal arts background acquired' at Oxford the political administrator was a 
rank amateur. His untutored advice could spell famine or pestilence and, 
only by accident, prosperity. The later addition of first veterinary and then 
agricultural officers provided a m e asure of expertise. However the specialist 
staff was very short handed: and even if they spent the better part of each 
month on tour in their districts, they coul d not hope to reach more than a 
fraction of the population. Consequently, they had little time in which to 
IS 
educate and persuade even if they had known the local language. In addition 
by the nature of crisis personnel problem made manifest yet another shortcoming 
in that to save the situation all available personnel even missionaries and 
traders regardless of their original assignments had to direct all their 
efforts towards averting the crisis. Thus there was only a thin line between 
administration, technical officers and other personnel. The result was not 
only that persons had to perform tasks to which they were unsuited but also, 
and this is more important, that the same familiar method of coercion had to 
be used. 
16. 
17. 
13. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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Secondly they were not prepared to listen to their African charges 
who had
3
 at the very minimum, managed at least to survive at the subsistence 
level. The African had some crude knowledge of his soils, had worked out a 
19 
rough technology and had even developed a primitive ''meteorological science'. 
Later other administrators would agree with Robert Delavignette, who had 
served in the colonial service in French West Africa, that African agriculture: 
was a complete mystery to us The whole situation was so 
different from what we had expected that we sometimes even denied 
to these people the status of peasants; we did not realise how 
they must have laboured and suffered to make their soil into 
cultivable land, and we regarded them as merely labourers, only fit to 
20 
be used on European plantations. 
• Experimentalism therefore often took the form of a doctrinaire 
approach to cultivation instead of taking into account the great variety 
of soil conditions in different parts of the colony. For example while 
cotton could be suitably grown in low lying black cotton soil areas of Central 
Kavirondo and rice in the irrigable Kano plains they were introduced in the 
highland areas and worse still in the m o re hilly North Kavirondo District only 
to be withdrawn later in the latter areas. And within the population the 
target of agricultural officers towards whom m o st of the educational efforts 
were directed were the men. However, such a strategy failed to recognise that 
agriculture was a community-wide enterprise and that many of the vital roles 
were reserved for wome n and children. 
All in all what is highly amazing is that experimentalism despite 
various shortcomings became a regular feature of rural reform. In 
Tanganyika the Africans referred to it as "Wazimu wa Mzungu". or the "white 
man's madness.
f;
 It was to be anticipated that each new district or agricultural 
officer would have his pet projects. Since he could not possibly pay attention 
to the whole gamut of affairs which were legally under his jurisdiction, he 
concentrated upon one or more items which would be his contribution to district 
development (and possibly to his promotion as well). As scon as the Africans 
discovered what the madness of the new officer was they could relax with regard 
to programs of his predecessor. This not only led to a great deal of 
19. 
20. 
Ibid, 
Quoted in Liebenow op cit p.'13 
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misdirected energy on the part of African cultivators , it also meant that 
agricultural innovation tended to be both capricious and transitory. Projects 
once launched and then permitted to lapse were even mere difficult to introduce 
21 
at a later date. 
African Small-holder Areas: A Vanishing Species? 
Due to the dynamics of agricultural development in different parts of 
African areas greatly accelerated mainly by political developments the situation 
in these areas did not remain uniform over time. An important consequence of 
this has been a gradual but occasionally rapid decline of what is termed 
African small-holder areas. A major cause of this decline has been the 
relocation of the African population particularly to former European areas or 
more accurately to originally African owned land although not necessarily the 
original owners or their descendants. Hence the need to delimit the extent 
of the discussion spatially taking into account the dynamics of the situation. 
The declining African smallholder areas that we are directly concerned 
with are those in which subsistence agriculture has been and for the remainder 
2 2 
continues to be the predominant mode of production. The argument is that it is 
in these areas especially the latter that agricultural policy and services as 
practised during the colonial period had and continues to have the greatest 
impact and are therefore the best illustration of colonial legacy for agricultural 
development. In view of this it is of great significance that a good part of 
the remainder of the areas in question fall in a category of areas that have 
been earmarked for concentrated development efforts by the independent 
23 government as that raises the vexed question of whether there have been any 
24 
qualitative differences in policy ana services. An example of the areas 
described is Kisumu district, a part of the former Central Kavirondo. And 
although it is more familiar and. will therefore receive special attention 
what is said about the district and generally of the old Nyanza Province by 
and large applies to other similar areas. 
21. Ibid pl4. 
22. Heyer et al give an alternative more wide embracing definition. Our 
concern to a large extent correspond: to their first category; the 'non-scheduled 
areas'
9
 the former African areas, with their well over one million small farms 
and two hundred and fifty thousand pastoral holdings. Heyer J and Waweru J.K. 
"The Development of the Small Farm'Areas'' in Heyer J. et al eds op cit Chapter 6. 
In terms of Gross Domestic Product it is these areas which are largely 
responsible for Product Outside Monetary Economy,; see.-for-example Republic of 
Kenya, Economic Survey, 1974, p2. 
23. For description of these areas see Alila, O.P. The Role of Public 
Bureaucracy in Agricultural Development in Kisumu. District,, .Western ,Kenya 
IDS Working Paper No. 277 pp 5-6. / 
24. A partial answer is given in Alila op cit pp 24-35 
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It is worth noting that the two major landmarks in the reduction 
of the expanse of these areas have been the emergency and the achievement 
of political independence, Up until the period of the emergency these areas 
could be viewed as being coterminus with African occupied land. After the 
emergency the areas growing cash crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, crops 
which were formerly banned in African areas, no longer fall within the grouping 
mainly due to the nature of their operations, especially capital outlay. With 
independence, areas affected by the government's major land re-allocation 
are replaced by incoming African farmers 
policies drop out. These include, areas from which Eurpean farmers/being 
25 
granted benefits enjoyed by their predecessors, as well as irrigation and 
other settlement schemes. In addition to large scale African farms emerging 
in these particular areas basically it is the nature of the operations greatly 
aided by the special attention of the government which disqualifies them 
from smallholder areas grouping. 
Lastly it should be emphasised that the grouping is not a hard and 
fast one but is rather on the basis of the extent to which the population in 
any particular area is engaged in subsistence agricultural production. And in 
terms of policy the main factors differentiating governmental political and 
economic policy between one area and another during the colonial period with 
major consequences for the ensuing period have been the possibility and extent 
of alienation of land to non-Africans and the supply of labour to non-African 
enterprises. 
Crisis Agricultural Policy and Services. 
In view of the foregoing discussion of crisis administration it 
should be obvious that the colonial administration coul'd not and did not 
infact formulate a policy and then systematically proceed to implement it 
employing instruments instituted and appropriate to the development of the 
agricultural sector in the African or native reserves. However, one can still 
talk of there having been an agricultural policy in two closely related senses. 
First that both action and inaction constitute a decision. Secondly, decision( 
or lack of decision (s) on the part of colonial administration in the long run 
at least constituted a policy. Such a policy is characterised first by 
fragmentation in the sense that there could be action in some areas while "there 
was in action in others although decision may or may not have applied to the 
2 6 
d i f f e r e n t a r e a s . S e c o n d l y , it is c u m u l a t i v e in the s e n s e that 
it is t h e s e f r a g m e n t s w h i c h add up o v e r time and c o n s t i t u t e p o l i c y 
•Which the c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n m a y h a v e b e e n a i m i n g at t h r o u g h 
t r i a l and e r r o r or m a y h a v e b e e n u n a w a r e of c o m p l e t e l y . In 
a d d i t i o n o c c u r e n c e of some f r a g m e n t s m o r e t h a n once is not r u l e d 
o u t . \ 
H o w e v e r , as o p p o s e d to c o m p i l i n g a c h r o n o l o g i c a l c a t a l o g u e 
of i s o l a t e d f r a g m e n t s one can b e s t o b s e r v e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of such 
a p o l i c y s u b s t a n t i v e l y d u r i n g a m a j o r c r i s i s . It was then t h a t 
u n d e r s t r e s s the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s f o r c e d to m a k e a d e c i s i o n and 
act or its p a r t i c u l a r r e s p o n s e m a d e it e v i d e n t t h a t e i t h e r a 
d e c i s i o n was m a d e and no a c t i o n t a k e n or no d e c i s i o n was made and 
2 7 
c o n s e q u e n t l y no a c t i o n t a k e n . One can then r e l a t e o c c u r r e n c e s 
d u r i n g c r i s e s to a s p e c t s o f - p o l i c y c o m i n g a f t e r or even g o i n g b e f o r e I 
as in the case of S w y n n e r t o n -plan w h i c h in e s s e n c e c o m p i l e d 
f r a g m e n t s of p o l i c y b e f o r e the^emer-gency. 
We h a v e i d e n t i f i e d four major, c r i s i s c r u c i a l to c o l o n i a l 
\ 
p o l i c y f o r m a t i o n w h i c h w i l l be d i s c u s s e d in a s e q u e n t i a l o r d e r 
t o .piece t o g e t h e r c o l o n i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y and s e r v i c e s so 
as to e s t a b l i s h the e x t e n t to w h i c h A f r i c a n S m a l l h o l d e r a r e a s 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y and s e r v i c e s have, t h e i r r o o t s in t h a t p e r i o d . 
The f i r s t c r i s i s was t h e c o m p l e t i o n of U g a n d a R a i l w a y w h i c h i 
s u d d e n l y p r e s e n t e d the c o l o n i s e r s w i t h the p r o b l e m of m a k i n g the 
c o l o n y p a y . The s e c o n d was the S e t t l e m e n t of E u r o p e a n s w h i c h led 
to land a l i e n a t i o n and the u r g e n t n e e d to find b o t h l a b o u r and | 
c a p i t a l . T h i r d l y , the two W o r l d War*s w h i c h r e q u i r e d i m m e d i a t e 
2 6 . T h i s is a d i f f e r e n t usage of f r a g m e n t a t i o n from t h a t of 
B r a y b r o o k e and L i n d b l o m in t h e i r th.eory of d i s j o i n t e d i n c r e m e n t a l i s m . 
T h e i r use of f r a g m e n t a l i s m in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g in e s s e n c e r e f e r s to 
i n p u t s by p a r t i c i p a n t s at v a r i o u s p o i n t s in the d e c x s i p n - m a k i n g 
p r o c e s s . In t h e case u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n not o n l y are t h e r e no c h a n n e l s 
for p a r t i c i p a t i o n but tho'se to be /affected are n o t even e x p e c t e d to 
p a r t i c i p a t e . T h o s e s u p p o s e d to p r o v i d e p o l i c y inputs are m e r e o b j e c t 
of p o l i c y and it is only from t h e i r r e s p o n s e s to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
a c t i o n s t h a t one c a n / b e s t only infer w h a t t h e i r i n p u t s w o u l d have 
b e e n . The f o c u s ha4 t h e r e f o r e to be on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n s . 
B r a y b r o o k e d and L i n d b l o m C . S t r a t e g y of D e c i s i o n , 1 9 6 3 , ! M a c m i l l a n . 
2 7 . • One o t h e r / p o s s i b i l i t y c o n s i d e r i n g the fact t h a t d e c i s i o n s are 
m a d e at v a r i o u s p o i n t s in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y is that a c t i o n 
if such a d e c i s i o n was s u p p o s e d to 
Llure to r e c e i v e a d e c i s i o n an 
•m d e c i s i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y a d e c i s i o 
c o u l d be t a k e n w i t h o u t d e c i s i o n . 
be m a d e h i g h e r up and t h r o u g h fa 
__afficer lov/er down a c t s on his o 
from the /top c o u l d even be o v e r l o o k e d l o w e r down or d i s r e g a r d e d 
,completely. All the same we should n o t e s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t in an 
instance' w h e r e a c t i o n is t a k e n aid e s p e c i a l l y if a d e c i s i o n was 
m a d e .to t h a t e f f e c t s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e can set'' a p r e c e d e n t w i t h 
;far-reaching i m p l i c a t i o n s for p o l i c y . In m o s t c a s p s p o s i t i v e if 
t h e r e is ,success and n e g a t i v e ifjj the r e s u l t is a f a i l u r e . 
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i n c r e a s e d f o o d p r o d u c t i o n a n d in i t s w a k e m a d e s o i l , c o n s e r v a t i o n ^ 
the only goal. Last hut not 
n o t o n l y a p r e s s i n g p r o b l e m b u t t h e m a j o r if not/least the Mau-Mau 
E m e r g e n c y w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e d w r i t i n g a
 T
A p l a n to I n t e n s i f y t h e 
2 S 
D e v e l o p m e n t of A f r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l
1
' In l e s s t h a n t w o m o n t h s ! 
Uganda Railway. 
T h e c l i m a x of t h e U g a n d a R a i l w a y c r i s i s w a s its c o m p l e t i o n 
in 1 9 0 1 w h e n it r e a c h e d K i s u m u on L a k e V i c t o r i a . B e f o r e t h i s 
a n d for a w h i l e t h e r e a f t e r B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in N y a n z a in 
p a r t i c u l a r w a s m a r k e d by p u n i t i v e e x p e n d i t i o n s e n d i n g w i t h t h e 
f i n a l s u b j u g a t i o n of the N a n d i in 19 06 a n d u n t i l t h e n t h e r e w a s 
..virtually n o e f f e c t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in the a r e a . The m a i n p r e -
o c c u p a t i o n , w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e d i m p o s i t i o n of law a n d o r d e r w a s w i t h 
p r o t e c t i n g a c o m m u n i c a t i o n r o u t e t o U g a n d a a n d it w a s p r e c i s e l y to 
p r o v i d e s t r a t e g i c a c c e s s to t h e h e a d w a t e r s of t h e N i l e t h a t t h e 
r a i l w a y w a s b u i l t . 
The l o a n f u n d s for b u i l d i n g the r a i l w a y h a d b e e n p r o v i d e d 
b y t h e B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y . To r e p a y the l o a n s a n d to t e r m i n a t e 
the a n n u a l g r a n t s - in - a i d p a i d by t h e T r e a s u r y to m e e t t h e 
c o s t of a d m i n i s t e r i n g B r i t i s h E a s t A f r i c a the c o l o n y h a d to 
p a y . This_ i n e v i t a b l y jneant b e i n g h o o k e d i n t o t h e m e t r o p o l e -
dependency set up i n which the colony 
c o l o n y /at t h e p e r i p h e r y of t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m in w h i c h t h e 
m e t r o p o l e is l o c a t e d , e x p o r t s p r i m a r y c o m m o d i t i e s a n d i m p o r t s 
m a n u f a c t u r e s . 
As t h e n e n v i s a g e d s u p e r f i c i a l l y by t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s 
s o m e of w h o m h a d S o u t h A f r i c a n b a c k g r o u n d s , e x t e n s i v e w h i t e 
s e t t l e m e n t w o u l d b r i n g i n t o p r o d u c t i o n h i g h - a l t i t u d e l a n d m u c h 
of it c l o s e to the.".line of r a i l a n d a p p e a r e d v i r t u a l l y u n u s e d . 
T h e s e t t l e r s w o u l d i n v e s t c a p i t a l a n d p r o d u c e c r o p s . C o n s e q u e n t l y 
t h e r a i l w a y w o u l d e a r n r e v e n u e by c a r r y i n g t h e i r p r o d u c e to t h e 
c o a s t , a n d b y c a r r y i n g t h e i m p o r t s i n l a n d t h e y w o u l d e a r n a b r o a d , 
a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d f i n a n c e its a c t i v i t i e s b y l e v y i n g t a r i f f s 
on t h e s e i m p o r t s . H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h t h e s e t t l e m e n t p r o g r a m m e 
2 8 . S w y n n e r t o n P l a n i b i d . 
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d e c i s i o n w a s u p h e l d t h e f o r m u l a n e v e r w o r k e d o u t so n e a t l y . 
It w a s at b e s t a l o n g t e r m s o l u t i o n for a p r e s s i n g n e e d . A n d 
t h e S e t t l e r s t h e m s e l v e s did n o t c o m e f r e e of p r o b l e m s e i t h e r 
as it w a s a p p a r e n t l y m i s t a k e n l y t a k e n for g r a n t e d . B u t t h e n a 
w a y o u t of t h e c u r r e n t c r i s i s h a d to b e f o u n d . 
T h u s it w a s on the N a t i v e s t h a t the b u r d e n o f m e e t i n g 
t h e i m m e d i a t e d e m a n d s f e l l . T h e s e i n c l u d e d g e t t i n g t h e S e t t l e r s 
s t a r t e d for t h e i r e n v i s a g e d r o l e a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d b y f u r n i s h i n g 
t h e m w i t h t h e i r r e g u i r e m e n t s of l a b o u r a n d c a p i t a l a n d a l s o 
a i d i n g t h e m s o m e w h a t i n d i r e c t l y b y s p e n d i n g r e v e n u e c o l l e c t e d 
f r o m A f r i c a n a r e a s on s e t t l e r r e l a t e d n e e d s s u c h as b u i l d i n g 
the n e c e s s a r y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in t h e i r a r e a s . T h e m a i n 
s t r a t e g i e s u s e d to t h i s end i n c l u d e d e x h o r t a t i o n , i n t r o d u c t i o n 
o f n e w c r o p s a n d i m p l e m e n t s , a n d s e e d d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
A m a j o r f o r m of e x h o r t a t i o n w h i c h a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s 
29 
w h i t e s a n d G o v e r n m e n t c a m e to be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h w a s t a x a t i o n . 
A h u t t a x w a s i n t r o d u c e d in 19 01 o s t e n s i b l y for r e v e n u e 
c o l l e c t i o n , to be f o l l o w e d in 1910 b y a p o l l t a x on a l l m a l e s 
o v e r s i x t e e n y e a r s o l d w h o did n o t p a y t h e h u t t a x . T h e 
l a t t e r m e a s u r e in p a r t i c u l a r can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a d e l i b e r a t e 
m o v e to f o r c e A f r i c a n s i n t o t h e c a s h e c o n o m y , a n d its i m p a c t 
w a s r e i n f o r c e d , n o t o n l y by t h e i n c r e a s e in t a x l e v e l s in 1 9 1 5 
and 1 9 2 0 b u t a l s o by i m p o s i t i o n of i m p o r t d u t i e s on m a n y 
of t h e l i m i t e d r a n g e o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s p u r c h a s e d by A f r i c a n s . 
A l l at a t i m e w h e n the t a x a t i o n of E u r o p e a n s w a s e x t r e m e l y 
30 
l i g h t A n o t h e r m e a s u r e w a s the f o r m a t i o n of the D e p a r t m e n t 
of N a t i v e A f f a i r s in 19 07 w h i c h w a s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t i t u t e d to 
d e a l w i t h l a b o u r s u p p l y a n d w h i c h e n c o u r a g e d coercro-n to..-force 
p e o p l e to w o r k n o t o n l y an p u b l i c w o r k s p r o j e c t s b y t for p r i v a t e 31 e m p l o y e r s as w e l l . ! 
It s h o u l d b e e m p h a s i s e d t h a t it w a s t h e c u r r e n t c r i s i s 
w h i c h m a d e t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of l a b o u r s u p p l y s t a r t a c q u i r i n g 
c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s , s u c h as b e i n g l i n k e d w i t h t a x a t i o n a n d use. 
of b r u t e f o r c e , w h i c h r e m a i n e d m o r e or l e s s p e r m a n e n t for t h e 
w h o l e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d . E a r l i e r on t h e c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t h a d 
2 9 . O d i n g a , 0 . N o t y e t U h u r u , H e i n e m a n h L o n d o n 1,967 p p O > v 2 
3 0 . W r i g l e y op cit p 2 3 1 
3 1 . S m i t h op cit p l l 5 N 
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found itself unable to meet its own needs for porters and road workers 
without resorting to conscription. It had even fulfilled demands of private 
employers in this way. It is apparent that this trend continued at an even 
greater pace as evidenced by the fact that the Liberal Government was 
pronpted to declare in 1908 that forced labour could not be tolerated in 
the Eritish Empire. However as Wrigley mildly puts it, though officials 
could no longer order natives to enter employment they were not debarred 
from encouraging them to do so, and the distinction between command and 
32 
persuasion was a very fine one. The point is however that short of close 
supervision the declaration was meaningless. 
The pros and cons of introduction of innovations especially the 
attendant exhortation has been discussed at great length. It therefore 
suffices to mention some examples without necessarily trying to make the 
list comprehensive and then comment on cotton and later in the discussion 
maize for illustration purposes. Crops introduced in Nyanza by about 
the 1920s included cotton, white maize,rice, simsim, cassava, groundnuts, 
Sugarcane and various kinds of vegetables. In addition implements including 
improved hoeblades, hand grinding mills and Ox-drawn plough were introduced. 
What we need to note to underline the utility of African response is the 
general consensus that up to first world war'native production' was 
33 
contributing much more than settler agriculture to the wealth of the country. 
The cultivation of cotton in Nyanza has its origins in the 
completion of the Uganda Railway and the introduction of Hut Tax. The 
purpose on which the success of both depended, was the development of some 
cash crop in Nyanza to allow Africans to pay their taxes in cash rather than 
kind and establish traffic for the rail road in order to pay for its 
mainte inance. Cotton was introduced simultaneously in 1907 in the Nyanza 
Province of Kenya and the adjoining Eastern Province of Uganda. 
John Ainsworth the then provincial commissioner (1906 - 1914-) first 
introduced cotton cultivation to several Luo areas borderingthe administrative 
34 
headquarters. 
Then the District Commissioner and his staff, between 1910 and 1913 
attempted to introduce cotton growing mostly along the road for easy 
supervision in the lakeside areas of Samia, Seme, Kisumu, Kano and Nyakech 
Locations, Their efforts met with a limited success only in Samia and Kano, 
and elsewhere the project was abandoned until the early 1920s. This is 
32. 
33. 
34. 
IDS/WP 327 
3 5 
despite the fact that the British East African Corporation had built a 
cotton ginnery at Kisumu in 1908 although for several years most of the seed 
cotton continued to be supplied from Uganda. Hay first notes appropriately 
that several authours have been at pains to explain this failure of the 
administration early cotton policy, citing African preference for food crops, 
lack of desire for trade goods and so on. Then she makes the relevant point 
that, the fact that cotton prices dropped fifty percent between 1910 and 
1914- is in itself probably a better explanation for the lack of Luo 
enthusiasm.^ 
On assumption of their duties in Nyanza in the 1920s agricultural 
officials made a more serious attempt to develop cotton production by way 
of field safaris to encourage cotton. There was however a change of policy 
in 1926 directing that officers confine themselves to earlier role of 
advising African growers and inspecting their crops. The main focus of 
cotton policy around this time turned out to be primarily on the Uganda 
border region and on North Kavirondo and only half - hearted attempts made 
to encourage cotton in Central Kavirondo. Furthermore, a steady fall in 
cotton prices to the grower greatly frustrated whatever efforts made and 
even the senior Commissioner, Nyanza Province, expected instructions to drop 
cotton cultivation in the province; This was not to be the case and to the 
37 
contrary he learned that an intensive propaganda campaign was to be waged. 
Hay rightly takes issue with fcam^nd others over giving the 
impression that colonial officials were engaged in a fairly consistent 
attempt to introduce cotton in Nyanza from 1906 onwards, and that the Luo 
must have been remarkably determined in order to resist such an onslaught. 
She then provides evidence from Kqrte in Nyanza which confirned that the 
3 8 
stereotype does not fit. Among the issues considered quite pertinent 
to this discussion, are lack of technical knowledge regarding the suitability 
35. The corporation was formed in 1906 deriving, most of its finance from 
the British Cotton Growing Association founded* in 1902 with the object of 
reducing L a n c a s h i r e ' s dependence on American supplies, but also receiving 
an imperial subvention for experimental work. The initial operations of the 
corporation were to include the Erection of a ginnery at Kisumu''and the 
distribution of cotton-seed to Kavirondo peasants. Wrigley op citgpp 221-2 
36. Hay'op cit pp 135-6. \ 
3.7. Hay ibid / \ 
3b. Ibid 
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of the crop for the area, coercion and even deceit, lack of fit of the crop 
for the existing agricultural cycle, low prices and qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively poor personnel and other resources. 
It is quite understandable that the Department of A.griculture set 
up in 1903 when the colonial government assumed responsibility for the 
agriculture of the country should have had limited resources during its 
39 is 
embryonic stage. What/ at issue is that these resources were directed 
to dealing with the problems of European agriculture that infact had a virtua 
monopoly of the services. And it was not two decades later for example that 
agricultural staff were posted to the African areas. 
In the meantime it had been the sole responsibility of the 
administration to promote agriculture by introducing cotton for example as 
discussed above. Moreover it was not considered a pressing need to devise 
ways for improving African farming. Thus in addition to tax collection the 
District Commissioner took charge of agricultural and veterinary matters. 
The significant implication of such a move for our concerns is that 
the promotion of agriculture was considered a law and order function and 
therefore left to the administration who played an active role in Virtually 
all agricultural matters even after the posting of agricultural staff to 
the African areas. All this was in any case in keeping with the official 
thinking at the time and reflected the official priorities in which 
agricultural development in the African areas was viewed as ultimately 
dependent upon the Africans themselves save seed distribution. 
The administration considered veterinary matters in comparison 
to purely agricultural matters more important and concentrated their efforts 
on the former which consequently took precedence over the latter. The 
posting of veterinary staff for example preceded that of agricultural staff. 
The mcve resulted from recommendations of a 1922 Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council which expressed concern about the spread of disease 
from African to European Areas. It concluded that the only effective way 
of preventing the spread of disease was to have veterinary staff in African 
as well as European areas. 
39. It was to take well over forty years before a member of the Executive 
Council was made responsible for Agriculture and allied services. Kenya 
Colony and Protectorate. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1945, p 19 
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This recommendation was implemented immediately. It is argued in this 
connection that trade in livestock had been going on from the time of arrival 
of the first Europeans bringing in breeding stock from the North and work 
oxen from all over the African areas. This trade was important to the 
uo 
European farmers and it made strong demands on veterinary control services 
As to purely agricultural matters it is stated in the 1920/21 
Department of Agriculture, Annual Report that the departments objective of 
increasing native production was to be directed towards an output of produce 
which can be exported. Crops such as maize, sorghum and millet, groundnuts, 
simsim, cotton, beans and peas fell under that category. In the department's 
view each of these crops was well suited to the resources and facilities of 
the native and no question of competition against the European growers should 
arise. It however did not fail to also recognise a popular view held by many 
in the colonial administration and Obviously by all the settlers that if 
natives are encouraged to develop their own land by being provided with 
necessary services as contemplated a sufficient supply of labour for European 
holdings would not be forthcoming. In the final analysis whichever of the two 
views whether or not to develop African areas prevailed depended on the nature 
of a particular crisis. In the case of Uganda Railway for example it was the 
former view which prevailed especially as the demand for labour was still 
relatively low while in the case of intensified European settlement the latter 
view prevailed. 
The services to realise the stated objective of increasing native 
production were conceived along lines summarised in the following quotation. 
To succeed in effecting a substantial improvement in native 
agricultural practice and increase in production a large number of 
instructors will be required. Native instructors are likely to 
succeed where Europeans would fail. The initial step is therefore 
the training of native agricultural instructors. They will be 
given a training of two or three years duration after which selected 
men who have satisfactorily completed their training will be posted to 
the native reserves. They will manage there a demonstration holding 
devoted to the crop to be grown. From these places as centres of 
operation seeds would be distributed and natives in the areas a.round 
would be taught how to grow different crops and how to secure..better 
yields than they obtained under their previous methods. 
40. Heyer op cit p3 
41. Dept. of Agriculture Annual Report 1920/21 Ibid. 
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However, the actual state of affairs in Nyanza Province in the 1920s was 
42 
that there were between two and five Agricultural Officers (AOs) and 
at the most only twenty-six instructors. To make matters worse the instructors 
43 
coming from Bukura Training Centre, one of only two training centres for 
the African Areas,had inadequate training and acted primarily as liason Officers. 
At any rate they were a crucial link between AOs and farmers for a very long 
44 
time. The arrangement which emerged it has been pointed out made the AOs 
typically have far more work of a directly executive nature eg running seed 
farms keeping the departmental vehicles in operation, supervising the 
Agricultural Instructors (AIs), draining swamps, organising locust and famine 
relief e.t.c. Therefore the image of an AO as being a farmer adviser or 45 even an agricultural scientist can be highly misleading. 
Even though judging from the population and size of Nyanza at the 
time even if the AOs directed their efforts to giving agricultural advice 
one can safely conclude that they could only have very limited success in 
changing African Agriculture. The estimated population for the province in 
46 
late 1920s was over one million persons. The province then consisted of 
three districts: North Kavirondo which included almost the whole of present day 
western province having an area of over 8,000 square kilometers; Central 
Kavirondo which included present day Kisumu and Siaya districts with an area 
of over 4,500 square kilometers; and South Kavirondo which included the present 
South Nyanza and Kisii districts with a total area of also over 8,000 square 
kilometers. To say the least this was an enormous area of scattered 
population and uneven agricultural development for two to five AOs to have 
an appreciable impact on. 
42. As of 1932 it was considered normal that there was one AO for North 
Central, and South Kavirondo districts and one for Bukura. As of 1946 there-
were 16 European Agricultural staff comprising senior AOs, AOs and AAOs. In 
addition there were three Makerere trained African Agricultural Assistants, one 
for each of the three districts. 
43. It is stated in 1936 Dept. of Agriculture Annual Report that at 
Bukura African apprentices from all agricultural tribes west of Nakuru are 
indentured for a 3 year course of training in agriculture and in duties of an 
Agricultural Instructor. All apprentices who complete this course satisfactorily 
should be well fitted to become peasant farmers - Agricultural apprentices are 
recruited from apprentices who have been through this course; other apprentices 
who do not obtain employment as agricultural instructors, or teachers of 
agriculture at mission and government schools are urged to return to their homes 
and farm on lines which they have been taught. 
44. The fact that extension work in the Reserves was done by Native ---—" 
Agricultural instructors is recognised in the 1931 Annual Report p 74.' 
4 5 . . M o r i s , J., Managerial Structures and Plan Implementation in Co.lonial._ 
and Modern Agricultural Extension: A Comparison of Cotton and Tea Programmes 
in central Kenya, in Leonard D.K- Ruraj
L
_Administration in Kenya.," EALB 1973, 
pl08. 
46. Fearn, H., Am African Economy OUP, 1961 p43. 
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In terms of the AOs operations Moris notes that with little in the 
way of an articulated national policy for African development the AO was 
actually left very much to his own wits in devising the kinds of projects which 
he considered desirable for his area. And from the Department's viewpoint he 
47 
could try any crop he liKed so long as it did not require much money. The 
three main methods which successively evolved in the operation that consistuted 
extension work were first seed issue, secondly the Agriculture Department 
maintaining its own holdings and experimental farms. And lastly the annual 
field campaign. The procedure for seed issue was that through a baraza called 
by the AO and including all the local chiefs, their headmen, and a few other 
interested farmers various experimental plots to be established were proposed. 
Seed was issued on the understanding that the person who accepted them would 
grow the stipulated demonstration plot. At first the seeds were issued free 
to anyone willing to plant them, but later it was decided to charge a nominal 
sum (two cents) on the understanding that the grower would return twice the 
amount after harvest to be redistributed by the local chief. In addition in 
an area targeted to receive bulk seed issue it would be an offence to plant 
48 
any other variety m that locality. 
Due to the failure of demonstration plots owing in part to the 
fact that weeding was done under duress by members of the community the 
Department of Agriculture was driven towards maintaining its own holdings 
49 
and experimental farms These provided work for AIs ana bulked supplies 
of new seeds. It is significant that it was the local native councils 
which provided the land and paid salaries of most of the local staff 50 
underlining the fact that African areas had to fend for themselves. 
It was mainly due to the fact that the demonstration plots appeared 
to make almost no impact on the surrounding area and the AOs soon tired of the 
continuallsupervision and reprimands they required, with limited success in 
the face of different crises, that the annual field campaign emerged. Administr-
atively along with preoccupation with executive functions and limited resources 
already mentioned an important shortcoming of this method was that there was 
often little continuing impact from one campaign to the next especially if a 
change of officers occured. 
47. Moris Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. 1931 Dept. of Agriculture Aimuai report notes the shift from small 
demonstration plots to Native Council seed farms which is rationalised on 
three major grounds. Native authorities having a direct and active share in 
responsibility for agricultural development in their areas. Acting as demonstration 
Centres for improved crops and methods. Lastly a centralised seed multiplication 
centre to maintain a permanent source of unconteminated seeds of the kinds required. 
By 1933 LNC" farms had entirely displaced departmental seed issues in the 
Central and. Nyanza Provinces. 1933 Annual report p 85. 
50. See Appendix Table 1 for an increased role of LNCs in issuing seed. 
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From the standpoint of the subordinate African Staff they often realised 
that they were being asked to achieve more than could be realistically expected, 
given the constraints of the environ ment, scarce resources, and their limited 
skills. Consequently they reacted to the selective enforcement of task norms by 
pretending to do everything while unobtrusively cultivating an "ear
11
 at 
headquaters to learn what the real priorities at any one point in time were. 
The AO was in most cases probably not even aware that his changing commitments 
were being continously assessed by his field staff, so that they could report what 
51 
was wanted and avoid wasting time on activities that were not really essential. 
To summarise, African agriculture related decisions resulting mainly from 
the completion of the Uganda Railway with important implications for policy 
include attempts to improve yields of food crops which also served as cash 
crops through the provision of better seed distributed free and improvement of 
cultivation practices. Attempts to promote the introduction of a limited 
number of non-food crops such as cotton. Decision to control serious outbreaks 
of disease among livestock and to protect the livestock trade. Attempts to 
improve the methods of treatment of hides and skins to encourage destocking 
and to encourage the production of ghee. These decisions were implemented 
with a significant resource input from local councils by the very small -.nuribers 
of agricultural staff allocated to African areas and by the administration . 
through a series of seed farms which were established for the multiplication 
of improved seed and the demonstration of improved farming practices. Thus in 
terms of the development of African farming system in the African areas it is 
obvious that a large part still remained untouched. 
European Settlement. 
As already indicated with the completion of Uganda Railway the problem 
of making the colony pay became acute. And although it did not serve the 
purpose immediately as expected all the same the view, which as a matter 
of fact was mooted before the completion of the railway, persisted that 
European Settlement was a panacea for the problems of the colony's economy. 
Hence the major proposition that rather than indigenous agriculture being 
relied on as a mainspring of increased trade and output, plantation and 
settler agriculture should play the leading role. The view was particularly 
bolstered by a series of favourable reports emphasising the apparent abundance 
of land and a climate suited to both tropical and temperate agricultural 
production. 
51. Moris Ibid. 
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The impetus for European settlement came from two major sources. The 
first was an active official encouragement. Secondly from large British 
Companies giving them large tracts of land at little or no cost and individuals 
who wished to realise their capital by selling leases to incoming settlers. 
Consequently as early as 1905 the colonial authorities agreed and not without 
pressure from the early European Settlers, to exclusive land rights for 
52 
Europeans in the Highlands. While Europeans through these mcves secured a 
monopoly of high potential land in the highlands, based on the w M t e highlands 
policy
s
agricultural tribes were contained within reserves. Thus around 20 
percent of the usable land area was alienated ie bought at nominal prices by 
Europeans for their exclusive use. In terms of individual acquisition their 
;i
farms" were extremely large averaging over 2,400 acres per occupier in 1932. 
the ex-servicemen most of whom were 
One group of beneficiaries worth noting were/brought with a blessing of 
the British government under the soldier settlement scheme with the aim of 
5 ° 
doubling the white farming population. ° The overall groxvth of settlers 
population and acreages they occupied over the years is given in the following 
table which gives a useful impression of the general trend of European 
Settlement. 
White Settlement in the Kenya Highlands 
1903 1915 1920 1934 1942 1953 
Settlers 
Capprox 100 1000 1,2000 2,000 3,000 4,000 
Occupied 
acreage 
V 4.5m 3.1m 5.1m 6.3m 7.3m. 
Source: Leys C. Underdevelopment in Kenya op cit p29 
At any rate what we need to emphasise is that settlement was an on 
going process and was not necessarily confined to the areas originally 
earmarked. This is borne out by the 1932 Kenya Land Commission finding 
that a certain amount of land which should have been treated as native 
54 
territory had indeed been wrongfully alienated. This meant relocating the 
52. Smith op cit pll3 
53. The trend of increasing the numbers of white settlers went on to as 
recently as 1953 with the Troup Report Smixh Ibid. 
54. Wrigley Ibid p259. 
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African population, in this case the Kikuyu who were the chief sufferes, to 
less desirable land labelled Forest Reserve. 
In comparison to the Kikuyu area
s
Nyanza was much less affected by land 
alienation which was limited to two major instances viz land for the purpose 
of mining gold and land for settlement of a few Indian Colonists, former 
railway builders, in the Kibos area. In any case for the African areas 
generally increased European Settlement meant not only further land alienation 
but also greater demands on the African population arising mainly from the 
deficient nature of European farming. 
A major drawback of European Settlement was that although they did not 
come to Kenya to work as peasants the settlers initially had neither the 
knowledge nor the capital to work their large tracts in ways very different 
from the Africans. Consequent upon that what perpetrated a crisis was that, 
a large proportion of these settlers farming activities ended in failure and 
to avert the crisis they had not only to be provided for but also afforded 
protection. The decision to salvage settler farming especially the fact that 
once taken it had a snowballing effect proved to be the major disadvantage 
to African farming outlasting the colonial period. A key element in this 
process discussed already, and to be considered in greater detail below 
was action aimed at satisfying the labour needs of settler farmers from 
African areas. 
Following the acquisition of land the main contingencies were capital, 
labour, and suitable as well as lucrative crops to be grown. It has already 
been noted in our discussion of African taxation that one of its major 
purposes was to serve settler capital needs. An equally if not more important 
need it served initially which in addition led to the suppression of African 
55 
commercial agriculture was the requirement of abundant supply of labour to 
European areas. A high level of supply was necessitated by the labour 
intensive nature of European farming. 
As a matter of fact both needs were closely intertwined i
n
 that with 
introduction of taxation Africans had to earn money either by selling their 
labour or by growing cash crops. Owing to the need of European farmers for 
labour and for freedom from competition' the former came to be the accepted 
way in which Africans could aquire cash. Thus through taxation Europeans got 
55. Smith Ibid pp 116-8. 
a monopoly of agricultural labour. It was reinforced by a Masters and 
Servants Ordinance which bound the African worker to serve out a contract 
on pain of imprisonment, and after 1918 by a Resident Labourers Ordinance 
56 
which converted the "squatter' labourer into a kind of serf bound to work 
his 
for the owner of/plot for a minimum of 180 days a year. 
It is estimated that by the mid-20s more than half the able-bodied 
men in the two largest agricultural tribes viz the Kikuyu and Luo were 
57 
working for Europeans The obvious implication of labour exportation of 
this magnituue is that the overall supply of labour on African farms fell. 
Granted for some at least, a remedy for the labour shortage was that the 
absentee labourers began to "work with money"- that is they began to send 
their wives money with which to employ someone to help with clearing, hoeing 
or weeding. In other words, these migrant labourers would pay substitutes 58 
to perform their normal share of the agricultural labour. But in view of the 
meagre wages noted earlier this option was not open to the majority which 
serves as a pointer to the disruption of African farming. In the same vein 
vnrigley also concedes, although only to a point, that the allegation 
that African economic agriculture, especially in the Nyanza Province, had 
been deliberately stifled in the interests of European farmers probably has 
some validity in respect of the early post-war years, when the whole 
endeavour of Government was directed towards the provision of labour for settled 
59 areas. 
However by its very nature labour exportation had even more far reaching 
implications for agricultural activity. In the first place Leys notes in 
connection with the farming status of Africans affected that within the space 
of a generation they had been effectively converted from independent 
peasants, producing cash crops for the new markets, into peasants dependent 
on agricultural wage-labour.^ Secondly Liebenow dentifies the emergent 
phenomenon of migration as one of the factors which indirectly undermined 
African attitudes towards agriculture complementing the frontal assault of 
the colonial bureaucracy upon traditional agriculture and stability of 
61 
rural life. For one thing the proliferation of opportunities for wage 
labour, together with the failure of cotton in Nyanza for example as a high 
value cash crop, produced the conviction that labour export was the most 
profitable allocation of resources and certainly the most secure. Consequently 
a large number of people by 1915 had come to feel that the only real economic 
56. For a discussion pf the squatter system see Leys op cit pp 4-6-47 
57. Heyer Ibid p 11 
58. Hay Ibid p 230 
59. Wrigley Ibid 
60. Leys Ibid ' . 
61. Liebenpnn Ibid. 
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security lay in a primary education and long-term wage employment outside 
the home. 
The function of agriculture therefore came to be viewed essentially 
as a holding operation. It was to continue providing the basic elements of 
subsistence, food for the family in the African areas and often for the 
absentee labourer as well, guaranteeing a home and a place in the community 
which could always be activated when necessary. Thus having to spend cash 
for any needs which could be provided locally was avoided. It is this 
economic division of the household between urban and rural spheres that was 
one of the ways in which the African population was made to subsidise the 
development of the European sectors of the economy.^ 
The bulk of this labour was employed in the plantation sectors producing 
coffee and sisal which survived on cheap labour and was therefore without 
6 3 
protection. " This was however not the case with regard to wheat growing 
and dairy farming which were high cost (and high disease risk) and would 
64 
have foundered without protection. All the same for their main sources 
of revenue the majority of the settlers relied on maize production which was 
an attractive crop in view of two major advantages of requiring little 
skill and capital. Policywise the manipulation of pricing and marketing 
policies and the disproportionate provision of credit and other services plus 
subsidies to large scale European farmers during the colonial period became 
continuing features of agricultural policy even after African farmers took 
over these particular farms. Thus relative to smallholder areas they 
continued to be the focus of government attention. 
62. Forrester, M.W., Kenya Today: Social Prerequisites for Economic 
Development, The Hague Meriton 1962 pp 109-112. 
63. These were the two leading Europeans crops whose export earnings resulted 
in European export superceding African export production. In addition to 
labour supplied African areas had also to supply maize to be used for feeding 
the African labour in the plantations. 
64. Smith Ibid. 
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World War I and II 
It is a matter of common sense understanding that war situations 
are crisis situations. Furthermore the gravity of these crises is 
determined by the extent of adaptation to wartime requirements which 
largely depends on conditions preceding the war especially the requirement 
of supplies. However with regard to implications of wartime crises for 
agriculture in African areas it is important to consider not only their 
origins outside these areas and infact outside the colony. Even more — 
important is the extent to which they became the main victims of these 
crises compared to European areas due to measures centred in them to cope 
with resulting contingencies or more specifically wartime requirements of 
men and supplies. While the former consideration meant an outright drain 
of resources out of these areas, in combination with the latter, both meant 
an impairment of African agriculture. What complicated the situation further 
was the fact that the two world wars coincided with or brought in their 
train outbreaks of epidemics coupled with, in between the wars, other calamities 
such as the Depression and Locust outbreaks. There was thus at the same time 
. - . 65 
a vicious circle of disease and famine during war years or thereabouts. 
The outbreak of the first World War marked a greater impact of 
colonial administration on the African areas than experienced heretofore. 
These areas were greatly afflicted by wartime requirements for labour and 
livestock which fell heavily on the people of Nyanza for example. These 
caused serious dislocations in the local economy as cattle requisitions 
depleted herds already reduced bj?' rinderpest and many of the men cons? cripted 
for the Carrier Corps never returned.^ 
There is evidence showing that Nyanza provided more than its share of 
manpower for the Carrier Corps in particular and also indicating its 
particular plight. More than half the total recruits (some 92,000 out of 
165,000) came from Nyanza province. And that is not all for between 1915 
and 1919 the province supplied nearly 200,000 males for civil or military 
recruitment (about one-sixth of the total population) and over 50,000 
head of cattle. It has been estimated that one third of all those 
recruited for the Carrier Corps died during the war while many of those 
who managed to return were disabled or weak owing to unhealthy or poor 
conditions they were subjected to. The District Commissioner of Kisumu 
6s. Hay Ibid. 
66. Ibid 
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wrote of the returnees that at least one half would not be fit for hard work 
61 
again for along time In addition small pox, plague spanish influenza 
accompanied the demobilised porters and spread throughout the province, 
reaching severe proportions in the years from 1916 to 1920. As if that 
was not enough a major famine occured in 1918 and 1919 and generally increased 
the hardships caused by war and d i s e a s e . ^ 
There is scarcity of information to help determine more precisely the 
nature of demands on African areas and. the extent to which they were 
negatively affected during this period. It can however be argued that in 
comparison to -
h
T
ar H
5
 on which there is relatively more information, during 
War I there was less resource drain from the African areas which was mainly 
to satisfy wartime requirements of men and provisions. This was basically 
due to limited penetration of African areas by market forces which since being 
formally brought into play after the completion of Uganda Railway, less than 
two decades before the outbreak of the war, was still in its initial stages. 
In addition to that was the fact that these areas had not yet 
experienced population'explosion which in the case of War II meant greatly 
taxing the land to meet food requirements of a larger population as well 
as those of the War. Ths forces which were to set in motion population 
increase as a result of the establishment of colonial rule, such as putting 
an end to inter-tribal warfare, movement of food to famine areas using 
relatively better communications routes established as a result of colonisation, 
rudimentary medical services etc had not yet gathered momentum. Another 
factor was the smaller population of European farmer's compared to War II 
which meant that the simultaneous demand for foodstuffs and labour for 
their farms and at the same time fulfilling wartime needs of men and 
foodstuffs was limited in scope. 
It should however be noted that a major view adopted at this time in 
an atmosphere of War economics was to have long term implications for 
African agriculture. It was assumed that in the future as in the embattled 
present a high degree of imperial self-sufficiency would be the paramount' 
67. Quoted in Hay, Ibid. 
68. Ibid. 
i 
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objective and that East Africa therefore could and should produce all that 
it was physically capable of producing, regardless of such mundane 
69 
considerations as comparative cost. The significance of this view is 
that one can already detect in it the rudiments of a decision which was to 
guide much of the thinking as well as action on African agriculture. That 
in African areas the farming system should aim at being not only self-70 
sufficient in food but also surplus providing on balance The aim of selr-
sufficiency in food locally on the one hand was most vigorously pursued 
wherever African areas experienced potentially devastating calamities especially 
famine. On the other hand territorial self-sufficiency and the aim of provision 
of surplus was given prominence during crises and also in case of calamities 
that adversely affected the European areas as well, A case in point is the 
depression, graphically documented by Wrigley quoted at length below. 
For the African population as well as for others the depresion 
was a great disaster. The prices of such comodities as hides, 
ghee, beans and simsim slumped even more drastically than those 
of staples of European agriculture. Wages fell back there 
was unemployment, in the sense that men actively seeking 
work were unable to find it they (African producers) 
were faced with the fixed obligation of tax payments, which 
now became a much heavier burden in real terms. The only 
solution was to increase production. Whether or not the 
Africans would have reached this conclusion for themselves 
the Government had reached it for them in face of the 
Colony's evident need for more experts, opposition to the 
development of native production for the market was melting 
away; it found only one voice among members of the economic 
Development Committee in 1934. An exception was still made 
for coffee but in 1937 the authorities felt able to take 
the first very tentative steps towards the introduction of 
71 
this industry in certain native areas. 
It is therefore significant that it was in the 1930s that the government 
declared an intention to intervene comprehensively in the local economy in 
contrast to earlier concentration on addition of new crops and tools. In 
1931 the Department of Agriculture proundly announced the beginning of "a 
69. Wrigley Ibid p 233. 
70. See Uchendu V.C. and Anthony KRM, Agricultural Change in Kisii District -
Kenya EALB 1975, p 34. 
71. Wrigley Ibid See also Heyer Ibid pp 14-15 on coffee decision. 
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long-range development programme for native agriculture" which had two 
major parts: a comprehensive survey of potential economic resources in each 
area and the formulation of individual development programmes for specific 
zones, taking soil and climatic variations into account and specifying the 
food and cash crops to be encouraged in each zone. 
Specific moves in the above direction involved a general reorganisation 
of African agricultural services. The reorganisation comprised of first, 
the replacement of technically unqualified agricultural officers with trained 
men recruited under the colonial agricultural scholarship scheme, secondly, 
there was an increase in the number of officers in this cadre in African areas 
with the total rising from 10 in 1930 to 17 in 1938. There was also an 
increase in the number of instructors and other subordinate staff serving 
under the agricultural officers the total number exceeding 200 In 1934-. 
72 
Nyanza had more than 45 instructors rising to 69 m 1939. However, 
staffing remained thin with districts notably in the Rift Valley having no 
officers. In any case a related potentially positive development worth noting 
was an increase generally in the number of native instructors coming out-of" 73 
the two Training Centres, Bukura and Scott Laboratory. 
Even in districts which were staffed there must have been concentrations 
of effort favouring the areas suited to particular crop or livestock 
products, favouring areas that were reasonably accessible and favouring farmers 
74 
who responded well ' Thirdly there was also at the district,level an 
important institutional development through the establishment in Central 
Province first of Native Agricultural Committees of Local Native Council 75 under the chairmanship of the district Agricultural Officer. 
Fourthly, a limited measure of decentralisation of the Department by' 
placing a senior Agricultural Officer (SAD) in charge of all agricultural 
work at the provincial level, instead of having the individual officers 
directly responsible to Nairobi office was taken.
7 6
 Thus the Nyanza SAO 
divided the province into ecological zones and drew up a programme of work 
which was put into effect in early 1933. The general objectives of the 
Central Kavirondo program of work in the decade included the extension 
of cotton and groundnuts as major cash crops, various regulations to improve 
the quality of marketed crops, and the beginning of soil conservation 
77 
programs. The SAO in addition regulated the periods within which crops 
72. See Appendices II and III for staff posting trend. 
73. See Appendices IV and V 
74. Heyer Ibid 
75. Dept of Agriculture Annual Report 1933, p 86 
76. Ibid 
77. Dept of Agriculture Annual Report, 1932, p 59.. 
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could be bought and instructed Indian buyers to refuse below-standard 
produce. 
It was also hoped that the depletion of soil fertility could be 
halted by gradually persuading farmers to consolidate their land and implement 
programs of mixed farming. The 1937 program of work declared in keeping 
with the emergent concern,that "Soil control, care, and improvement" should 
be given precedence throughout the province. Individual farmers were to be 
encouraged to adopt measures comprising stone terracing, contour lines of 
grass, live hedges on boundary ditches, reducing cultivation on steep slopes, 
of 
better conceptions/land ownership, wind breaks, contour ploughing and 
planting, stall feeding of livestock, use of manure and compost as fertilisers, 
control of grass burning, increased tree planting and the mulching of crops. 
However the resources and personnel to/?he program into effect were lacking 
and it was still in its initial stages at the outbreak of War II. It was 
the contingencies to be coped with during this letter crisis that greatly 
heightened the concern with soil conservation bringing it to a fever 
pitch after the war. 
We should however reiterate in passing that during war II there 
was again military and civil conscription and on a greater scale as already 
pointed out. The former was received relatively more positively by Africans 
78 
due to more favourable conditions in the service.'" The latter was less 
popular especially in the case of "civil conscription" of labour for 
European farmers which were technically regarded as "essential undertakings" 
during the war. This.task of labour conscription became a major preoccupation 
of administrative personnel at the expense of 'normal' administration which 
virtually came to a grinding halt. In addition this was happening at a time 
when they were less in numbers and had a high turnover rate due to being 
called for military service. 
The main contingency the colonial, administration was confronted with 
during War II, towards which both agricultural and administrative personnel 
attention was directed and everything subordinated to,-was food supply. 
And to whatever level the local population may have fed itself the aim in 
increasing the food supply was to serve the wartime requirement-of feeding 
78. Hay Ibid. 
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large garrisons of troops stationed in the colony and prisoners-of-war. 
Once again as yet another feature of wartime conditions there was compuio_ry 
extraction of cattle from African areas. The military supply board paid 
for them prices that did not reflect their current market value. The 
Board established a standard price range for cattle which was in effect the 
79 
lowest common denominator of existing prices. 
With regard to other food stuffs it was agreed at a meeting of 
officers from both Nyanza and Central Provinces that in addition to increased 
maize production simsim, groundnuts and mtama should be increased. In the 
case of groundnuts where possible it should be interplanted in cotton. 
Also in the Kano plains and other suitable areas rice should be pushed even 
to the extent of orders under the Defence (Agricultural Production) 
80 
Regulations if necessary. The climax of these actions was a major onslaught 
in 1942 when there was an increased production drive under the Increased 
Production of Crops Ordinance. Out of the Ordinance emerged an important 
innovation which has survived and therefore worth noting. This was the concept 
of short term credit and guaranteed minimum r eturn for a wide variety of 
annual crops grown ensentially on contract for the government on European 
*
 8 1 
farms. 
At any rate there was a greater part played by African areas in 
the provision of other foodstuffs as exemplified by the case of maize 
shown below by figures of deliveries to control. 
1944 1945 1946 
Native (Nyanza) 645,924 bags 716,459 bags 666,308 bags 
Natives (other) 16,151 og 990 108,990 
Total 663,075 816,449 775,298 
Non - native 401,378 545,515 562,243 
Source 1945 Dept. of Agriculture Annual Report pll. See also Heyer Ibid pl6 
79. Ibid. 
80. Note on a meeting of" PCs, Nyanza and Central, Agricultural Officer 
in change Nyanza, SAO Central Province and Director o f Agriculture* Kenya 
National Archives Def 3. 
81. Smith Ibid. 
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The encouragement by the government of a substantial increase in 
the production of foodstuffs during the war led to a large increase in the 
production of food crops for sale by African farmers despite temporary 
reductions in staffing. An important consequence of the high level sale 
of surplus food crops due to war created demand was that Africans were 
initiated into the money economy in greater numbers. Thus it can be 
argued the African population would respond whenever they were given 
the opportunity to produce crops with a reasonable cash return for the 
effort. 
The higher sale is even more remarkable inview of the fact that 
3 3 
marketing during the war^ was highly controlled as noted in the quotation 
below. However the point to note is that this must have meant discrimination 
against some produce from the African areas whenever it served the purposes 
of powers that be. 
The work of the field staff in native areas has been 
concerned mainly with production and considerable 
amount of their time has to be devoted to matters 
concerned with the organisation of marketing of the 
various crops and with assistance in their areas 
84 
to the work of numerous wartime produce controls 
An important i nstitutional innovation emerging out of these 
controls 
was the creation of an Agricultural Betterment Fund (ABF) in 
Nyanza Province. Its source of funds was the difference between the price 
paid to the grower and the railhead value of his produce that was paid into 
the ABF. Since a single producer price ruled throughout a district the 
overcropping which prevailed around marketing centres and rail head points, 
was progressively eliminated. An allowance was given for transport which 
was shs 1/40 per bag in North and Central Kavirondo and Shs. 2/10 per bag 
in South Kavirondo. In addition a grade Cess of 35 cts was paid into the 
85 
fund Later in the fifties this fund would be drawn upon to provide 
financial incentives to a class of "improved farmers" in Nyanza whose 
grooming started about 1951. 82. See Smith Ibid and Heyer. 
83. European Marketing Officers posted to each of the districts in 
Nyanza. 
84. 1943 Dept. of Agriculture Annual Report p5. 
85. 1946 Dept. of Agriculture Annual Report pp 44-45. See also 
Uchendu and Anthony op cit p 36. 
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What was of major long term significance about the deliberate wartime 
policy of maximum production of fooo grains from the land were the crippling 
effects it had on the colony's agriculture especially in the African areas. 
It had led to a period of continous exploitation of arable land to produce 
needed wheat and maize and other crops without a commensurate input of 
fertilisers, soil conservation measures, or sound long-term farm planning. 
The result was lasting damage to land in African areas. Soil erosion was rife 
all over the country notably in Fort Hall and Machakos. In these and other 
African areas the concern with falling soil fertility level became paramount 
after the war ana soil conservation received a major emphasis in agricultural 
86 
extension m tne post-war years. 
Measures to deal with the soil erosion contingency were embodied 
in the 1946 10 year, development plan. The emphasis in the African areas 
was on reconditioning these areas and settlement of excess population. 
Relatively large allocations were made especially for soil conservation 
and water development under this so-called plan. For general agricultural 
development additional funds came from ordinary colony estimates, local funds 
provided by African district councils, and funds controlled by the East 
African High Commission. Thus post war resources were increased but at a 
time when agrarian problems had mounted to an all time high. 
The strategy adopted to deal with the deteriorating condition of 
African agriculture had both a long - and short - term aspects to it despite 
the narrow concerns and virtually no systematic implementation. The thrust 
of the long term aspect of the strategy was exploring the possibilities of 
obtaining additional suitable land to which surplus populations could be 
moved and in which they would farm under strictly controlled conditions. 
The main factors to contend with in this connection were problems of bush 
clearing (tse-tse) fly elimination and the provision of a dequate water supplie 
The short term activities aimed at preventing further deterioration of soil 
resources and embraced "reconditioning
1
' which included mechanical soil 
conservation and/or improved farming methods. The former involved making 
terraces, grass strips cut off drains etc Methods for achieving the letter 
followed prewar pattern namely use of manure, resting pasture etc. 
Brown points out that all the available machinery of the soil conservation 
was in use on the "non-nativa" areas and African areas virtually the whole 
time of agricultural staff was devoted to soil conservation. Brown op cit 
p40. 
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These methods for improved farming constituted the mixed rotational 
grazing system with land resting under temporary grass leys grazed with 
livestock which Clayton argues had fallen out of official favour after the 
87 
war. The main principle disputed was the need for individual ownership 
8 8 
and consolidation which led to stiff opposition in some districts. 
Consquently as a basis of extension effort mixed smallholding was replaced 
by planned Group farming in Nyanza in 1948 although net ruling out individual 89 
farming on launching group farm construction period. Among the Kikuyu who 
were considered individualistic enclosures became the basis of extension 
„ . 90 
effort. 
At any rate even if smallholding idea no longer enjoyed official 
favour this certainly was not the case with regard to methods originally 
intended for the purpose which for example constituted criteria of better 
farming rewards discussed below. And it is important to note in addition 
that even with greater resources available these methods were thought to 
require legislative deterent to back them up. 
The extension service has in the past made use of 
demonstration precept and in certain cases legislation. The 
result of seme 25 year's work on these lines has been 
to indicate clearly that unless some direct pressure is 
applied to urge improved methods and practices and unless 
such pressure is continously applied the results that are 
91 
obtained are extremely slow. 
It is in the context of change of outlook in the wake of a crisis 
mentioned previously that one can understand a novel addition to extension 
method as rewarding better farming which was applied to Nyanza. The "rewards 
for good husbandry'
1
 came from ABF funds noted earlier. To qualify for the 
rewards the holding of the beneficiaries had to pass inspection on three 
basic points, (a) complete soil conservation (b) half of arable land resting 
under grass and (c) the maintenance of the soil fertility of the arable land 
by the use of properly made farm yard manure or compost. 
87. Clayton Ibid p22. 
88. Smith Ibid pl22 
89. 1948. Dept of Agriculture Annual Report p22. 
90. 1950 Dept. of-Agriculture Annual Report pl7. 
91. Clayton Ibid p21. 
\ 
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Rewards were made in the form of grants for the purchase of 
carts, wheelbarrows, fencing wire, farm implements and tools. They 
later included free labour for approved work, such as hedging and sometimes 
a cash reward. The value of an initial award was usually Shs. 250/= 
92 
increasing at each stage of development to a limit of £50. A man's holding 
was then considered to be sufficiently developed to provide adequate 
security for a loan from the Betterment funds to meat the cost of still 
further improvement. 
The free gift aspect of the scheme was abandoned in'the mid-
fifties when A.B.F. funds dried up and farmers were consequently unwilling 
to continue for no payment practices for which they had formerly received 
payment. Inducements to better farming then took the form of loans to 
individual farmers A major consideration being that the purchases made 
by a farmer out of this loan had to be sanctioned by his agricultural Officer. 
However what should be of greater concern is the future implications, of 
such moves and accompanying methods for differentiation among the farming 
populace. 
To conclude the discussion on War II crisis in particular it should 
be noted that it marked the end of an era of crisis administration proper. 
What brought it to a close was the final crisis, the Hau Mau Emergency. 
Furthermore although after the emergency conscious attempts were for the first 
time desperately made to develop some African areas to save the situation 
at least the methods employed remained the same as in the preceding period 
in these earmarked areas. As for the remaining African areas which still 
constituted smallholder areas according to our definition they were either 
neglected or at least things went on as before up until the time of 
independence and thereafter This was with regard not only to methods but 
policy as well, given the resource constraints on the colonial administration 
in particular which forced it to focus on areas posing the greatest threat 
to it and in the process transforming these areas. 
i 
\ Lastly, an important serious ill effect of the conservation phase 
with far reaching implications for future implementation effort was the 
poor relations that existed in African areas between agricultural staff and 
the people. Several years of coercion to achieve the necessary soil 
conservation measures and against the opposition of African politicians 
left the Agricultural Department's field staff very unpopular. It is now 
well recognised even by those who were directly responsible for the implementa-
tion of these measures that had more thought .been devoted in 194-5 to the—real 
and underlying causes of soil deterioration more forward-looking policies could 
92. 1952 Department of Agriculture Annual-report p.. 35-6. 
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93 
perhaps have been adopted earlier with more and far - reaching results. 
Mau Mau Emergency 
The Mau Mau Emergency was in essence the climax of growing political 
consciousness of the peasants due to.enforcement and land issue during the 
ion of the whole cuLrnial economy. .Thus . , 
colonial period-But viewed in broadsr terns it called intc question the tontmuat-/ 
coming unexpectedly as it did it brough to ahead in particular the political 
problems of the colonial administration in terms of African-Settler production 
relationships that necessiated a sudden change of outlook with regard to 
African areas. Hence the c-risis situation. 
To begin with in an attempt to limit M.au M'.au attacks on the white 
farming community t housands of landless Kikuyu were being repatriated by 
the lorry load from the large settler farms where they had been labourers 
and squatters to the African reserves. The tragedy o'f the whole situation 
was that most of these people had long since lost any claims to land or 
livelihood in the communities to which they were being sent. However a 
positive consequence was that the presence" °f these repatriates in the 
reserves was not only an embarassment to the colonial administration at 
a time when it was in the process of relocating Kikuyu and Embu people 
into fortified village camps but also the British government. The Mau Mau 
Emergency was drawing world attention to the apparent failure of British 
policy to bring about Kenya's peaceful evolution into a self-governing 
94 
multi-racial state. 
Internally the Emergency had a paralysing effect on government 
machinery with obvious consequences for all services except security as the 
quotation below specifically referring to the Department of A griculture 
clearly indicates. 
Many officers were devoted to Emergency duties 
and, although everything possible was done to 
lessen the ill - effects, both extension and 
investigational work suffered. A number of 
our best African instructors were mir. dered and 
a number also joined with the Ilau Mau and 
possibly this loss of our trained staff 
95 
constitutes the most serious setback. 
53. Brown Ibid. 
94, Moris J.R. The Agra ian Revolution in Central Kenya: A Study in 
Farm Innovation in Embu District, PhD thesis Northwestern University, 1970. 
95. 1952 Department of Agriculture Annual Report pi. 
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However in the context of this analysis the major significance 
of the Mau Mau revolt was that it made the colonial administration realise, 
the hard way, at least some of the several short comings of the 1946 plan 
for the development of the African areas. Thus the Emergency crisis brought 
the colonial administration face to face with the contingency of developing 
African agriculture. In particular the critical importance of land in 
agricultural production and hence agricultural development. 
In 1953 in response to the Emergency 'it was agreed that it would 
be necessary to develop schemes to provide employment to Kikuyu repatriates 
both in the Reserves and on development projects, having as their main 
objectives the raising of agricultural productivity, and the human and stock -
carrying capacity of the land. At the same time the Government has decided 
to draw up a plan of accelerated agricultural development of the Native Land 
Units in other provinces of Kenya! A plan compiled by RJM Swynnerton, popularly 
96 
known as the Swynnerton plan" was the response to this request. 
The main consideration as regards agricultural policy and services 
is that owing to the crisis some Africans in their areas, practically all 
of high potential, and later through new settlement as a result of disproport-
ionately greater resource allocation and generally more attention assumed 
the position of settler areas vis a vis the remaining African areas. 
Consequently the differential relationship hitherto witnessed during the 
colonial period between European and African areas started reigning between 
the areas in question and those which continued to have smallholder areas 
status. The latter judging from the colonial experience were therefore 
destined to remain peripher .al to higher rate of agricultural change that 
the former areas started experiencing except of course in cases where 
deliberate measures were taken to avert the trend. 
The Swynnerton plan reflected a continuation of the post - war 
pattern of agricultural development policy trend to the extent that it 
acknowledged the advantage of the sound foundation laid during the last 
eight years, covering soil conservation livestock improvement, construction 
of water supplies and experimentation into farming systems, cash crops, 
methods of cultivation, fertilisers and pasture research' Thus
 J
It is on 
the knowledge so gained and the work already done that the next phase of 
97 
intensification can be built. An important exception which was to reverse 
a previous tendency worth noting was that the plan saw little hope of re-settlement 
96. 
97. 
Swynnerton op cit p (i) 
Ibid. 
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as a solution to agricultural problems. It was infact at this point in time, 
a crucial move which meant that intensification of agriculture in existing 
populated areas was to become the major policy thrust as most land was 
settled. Thus having the requisite resources became a critical issue. 
To effect intensification the Swynnerton plan recommended large 
increases of advisory staff, land consolidation, and farm planning services 
and set targets for greatly increased cash crop in African areas. To this 
end Britain made to Kenya a grant of £5 million. A meagre sum compared to 
£27,614,000 spent by the Kenya government directly on security operations 
98 
between the beginning of the Emergency a
n
d June 30th 1955. 
Basic to intensification was consolidation of land fragments into 
single holdings, formerly confined to Central Province, but now to be extended 
to other areas also classified by Swynnerton as 'suitable for balanced mixed 
99 
farming more or less intensively'. In addition individuals were to be issued 
with registered freehold titles. The larger lease holders would then be able 
to borrow from the commercial banks or from the government on the security 
of their title. It was a politically charged strategy echoing earlier 
propositions ^ ^ of the Department of Agriculture that energetic or rich 
Africans will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating 
a landed and a landless class, This was considered a normal step in the 101 
evolution or a country. 
The argument of the Department of Agriculture which was to guide 
itg-
v
 activities in implementing the plan was that a landless class already 
existed in Central Kenya in particular. But because of reciprocity and generosity, 
its members continued to eke out a livelihood by cultivating tiny plots which 
were borrowed from one season to the next. Since the perennial cash crops 
which were being suggested - coffee, tea, dairying, and pyrethrum - were three 
or four times as labour intensive per acre, and were also much more valuable 
than the maize and beans subsistence crop; the landless labour force could 
earn a substantially improved living working as wage labourers on large farms 
98. Moris Ibid p82 
99. Smith Ibid pp 126-35 
100. 1948, 1950 and 1952 Department of Agriculture Annual Reports. 
101. Swynnerton Ibid p 10. 
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planted to cash crops. In the long run the greater degree of economic 
specialisation which would followed from the creation of 'economic*' size 
holdings would encourage the spread of high value cash crops and with a 
reasonable livelihood for those who were already landless. But first land 
registration was necessary as an administrative measure to identify clearly 
102 
who were the owners and who were the borrowers of land. The view to say 
the least was idealistic considering the ecological and socio-economic 
heterogeneity of the areas to which it was considered equally applicable. 
In any case what was to make a big difference was which of these 
areas became the focus of attention and thereby received the necessary 
resources for intensification. 
The focus of attention were Kikuyu areas of Central Province as 
revealed by the progress of land consolidation. Land consolidation went 
a head rapidly in Kikuyu land and was completed in three districts and 
the more productive parts of a fourth by 1960. The actual area involved 
as of June 30, 1960 was 884,000 acres belonging, to 148,000 farmers in 
Central Province. A further 230,000 acres was in the process of consolidation. 
Enclosure of unfragmented high-potential land in Rift Valley and Nyanza 
provinces affected 989,000 acres belonging to 65,000 farmers. The total 
area consolidated or enclosed, 2,925 sq miles was about 6.8 per cent of 
Kenya's high potential land and about 8 per cent of such land in African 
103 
areas. 
A further indication of this trend is given by progress in farm 
lay out and plans recorded as of 1962 
102. 
103. 
Moris Ibid p . 89 
Brown Ibid p. 43. 
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Farm layouts 
Central Province 
Nyanza Province 
Rift Valley Province 
Other 
Number of 
farms 
53,318 
10,687 
275 
213 
Acreags 
302,551 
1+5,244 
8,022 
10,149 
74,493 365,926 
Farm Plans 
Central Province 
Nyanza Province 
Rift Valley Province 
Other 
5808 
1063 
524 
900 
60,597 
34,410 
17,167 
17,636 
8275 126,810 
Source: Clayton Ibid p. 45 
Thus one can see the areas that were the focus of attention, 
practically all in Central Province forgoing ahead. The situation is very 
well depicted by the quotation below which also summerises, the explanation 
for the emerging trend. 
time 
At the same/as the restrictions (on 
growing cash crops) were relaxed, central 
Province received a substantial increase 
in development resources during and after 
the Emergency. The infrastructure that 
was developed to help control the political 
situation benefited agricultural 
development greatly. Similarly, the 
increase in provision of agricultural 
services which was associated with the 
political situation made a considerable 
contribution. It was at this time that 
land consolidation and registration of 
little took place. These factors combined 
with complete reversal of policy with 
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respect to coffee and other high value products 
enabled C.entral province to gain a dominant position 
in the 1950's, a position which it has retained 
104 
ever since. 
In direct contrast were African smallholder areas, in Nyanza for example, which 
had not benefited from positive developments arising from the Emergency such 
as improved infrastructure. And more importantly the decision at last by the 
colonial administration to give in to African pressure and allow them to grow 
cash crops that were already found suitable for particular parts of the C o u n t y 
with emphasis on areas most affected by the Emergency. Furthermore when the 
colonial administration started encouraging cash crop growing in these areas 
the inadequate farm planning staff were concentrated in them as it was a 
presequisite for cash crop growing. Still the demand for farm plans was so 
great these areas for the available staff to cope with, despite stringent 
requirement' that the method had to be loosened for faster completion. This 
situation was by no means ameliorated by the fact that the colonial administration 
failed to recruit all the additional staff provided for under the Swynnerton 
plan.^~°^ Thus without adequate numbers of suitable staff individual farm planning 
moves in Nyanza coming as late as 1950s, starting in North Nyanza, could not 
be expected to make marked strides. 
The situation was further complicated by problems on the consolidation 
front. As of 1956 Nyanza was still negotiating for experienced consolidation 
staff from the central province and yet consolidation was a major if not the 
sole requirement for farm planning. An important consequence of this 
consolidation staff shortage was that the Administration came to play a much 
larger role in land consolidation using its familiar method of coercion. 
This sparked off resistance in C entral Nyanza in particular due to a high level 
of peasant counsiousness and based on the fear of further land alienation as 
had occured in Kikuyuland. Therefore the grim picture of the situation 
prevailing in Nyanza given in the quotation below is not at all surprising 
although exception must be taken of the fact that it bases Nyanza's development 
potential on the current marketed output. 
104. Heyer Ibid p. 26 
105. 1954 Department of Agriculture Annual Report p. 1 
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Nyanza's development during this period was 
disappointing in contrast with the rapid rate of 
development in Central Province. Nyanza did not 
have such large areas that were well suited to the 
expansion of cash crops higherto prohibited, and 
in much of Nyanza there was a lack of suitable high 
value products on which a faster rate of development 
could be based. Coupled with this was the fact that 
Nyanza's more limited development opportunities had 
already been more fully exploited previously than 
had those in Central Province. Nyanza did not stagnate 
but its marketed output grew much less dramatically 
than of Central Province.
-
^' 
One needs to add that the trend of focusing on high potential areas 
in question was to continue for the remaining part of the colonial period, 
which was in any case dominated by constitutional ccnfrences and bargains, 
and well into the post Independence period. As for the other areas it is only 
with the drawing up of the 1974/78 Development Plan that one sees a seemingly 
107 
determined attempt to shift attention to them. 
Conclusion. 
The main thrust of this discussion has been to identify the 
landmarks in Kenya's agricultural policy and services during the colonial 
period with particular reference to African small holder areas. The main 
contention is that the pattern of policy and services that evolved in these 
areas has at best undergone limited modification. Otherwise it has remained 
intact. There are several instances of policy and services mentioned which, 
to a reader familiar with Kenya's agricultural policy and services, 
automatically support this contention. However I should hasten to add that 
the analysis is not intended for only this type of reader. The end objective 
is to put Kenya's Agricultural policy and services for smallholder areas into 
its proper historical perspective in order to better understand its present 
functioning. 
The strategy I have chosen as opposed to simply juxtaposing instances 
of policy occuring during the colonial period and the current trend is to 
systematically identify the policy that evolved during the colonial period 
and then relate it to discussions of macro and micro levpT policy and services. 
108 
The former has already been discussed briefly elsewhere. The latter will 
be taken up in a discussion of agricultural extension bureaucracy. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
Hcyer Ibid. 
Alila Ibid p5 
Alila Ibid. 
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There are however certain outstanding broad trends of policy and 
services worth summarising here. First is the relative neglect of food crop 
production. Presumably a task traditionally performed by Africans and therefore 
not requiring advice save introduction and distribution of seeds coupled with 
pressure to grow more in periods of srress eg famine, wars etc. A corollary 
to that is little or complete lack of attention to labour and capital as 
constraints in agricultural production in African smallholder areas. Secondly, 
a focus on cash crops in particular areas practically all of high potential. 
Thirdly a focus on progresive farmers in these ana African smallholder areas. 
This is the now familiar line of least resistance argument. Fourthly a view 
of land tenure as a close correlate of agricultural development and therefore 
tying loans for example to land tenure status. Lastly, the reliance by the 
Ministry of Agriculture on the administration, for long the champion of 
agricultural development. A costly trend in terms of the methods the 
administration is familiar with. 
years) 
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•X Table I Seed Issue to Farmers in Nyanza Province 1928-1938 (selected 
(a) Department of Agriculture 
Sources of Seed Issued (b) Local Council Votes 
(2,000 lb. units) (c) Local Council Seed Farm 
Seed Type 1928 1928 1934 1934 1934 1938 1938 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) 
Maize 46.0 - 8.0 2.0 0.4 35.4 
Wheat .2 3.0 0.8 - - - -
Sorghum 1.8 - - - 1.4 10.8 
Mwale 1.4 - - - - -
Beans 9.0 4.8 - - - -
Peas .48 - 5.6 - - -
Chiroko (Sunflower) 1.08 6.0 - - - -
Groundnuts 7.2 1.0 - - 6.2 -
Rice - neg - - - 10.2 
Potatoes - - 12.2 1.4 - -
Trees - - - 150.4 - -
Vegetables - _ 0.8 - - -
Millet - - - - 1.0 16.6 
Source: Uchendu V.C. and Anthony K. , Agricultural Change in Kisii District, 
Kenya EALB 1975 p. 35 The Table shows the declining importance of the 
Department of Agriculture as the source of seed. 
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Appendix Table III 
AGRICULTURAL STAFF IN NYANZA 194-6 
Europeans 
Senior Agr. Off. Agr. Off. Asst. Agr. Off. 
Kisumu 2 3 
Maseno 1 1 
Kakamega 1 
Bukura 3 
Kisii 1 2 
Kericho 2 
Africans 
Agriculture Dept. Local Native Council Total 
Agricultural Assistants
1
'
1
 3 3 
Clerks 8 8 
Instructors 168 ? 168 
Agr. Inspectors - 216 216 
River Scouts 40 - 40 
Produce Inspectors 13 146 159 
Market Staff 41 41 
Labour 108 389 497 
" Makerere trained. 
Source: 1946 Agriculture Department, Annual Report p. 31. 
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PUPILS AT SCOTT AGRICULTURAL LABORATORY (NAIROBI) 
AND BUKURA (KAVIRONDO) 
YEAR NUMBER OF PUPILS NUMBER SENT OUT TRAINED 
NRB BUKURA NRB BUKURA 
1923 21 
1924 42 30 
1925 43 32 10 
1926 34 55 28 
1927 42 45 9 
1928 • 50 36 8 4 
1929 48 32 24 20 
1930 60 48 20 7 
1931 60 51 14 14 
* Course extended from 2 to 3 years 
Source: 1931 Dept. of Agriculture Annual Report p. 75. 
Appendix Table V 
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT OBTAINED BY APPRENTICES 
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT 1925-9 1930 1931 1932 
(SCOTT AGR. LAB) 
Native Agricultural Instructors 
Forestry 
Educational work 
Alliance High School 
European farms 
Other work 
Returned to Native Reserves 
(BUKURA) 
Native Agricultural Instructors 
Educational work 
European farms 
Other work 
Returned to Native Reserves 
Source: 1932 Dept of Agriculture Annual Report p . 70. 
43 
2 
4 
1 
11 
6 
10 
2 
4 1 
3 
1 
10 
1 
1 
1 
6 
24 
2 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
9 
1 
11 
1 
2 
9 
